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Within the defence sector there have been marked changes in the nature of the composite 
industries. This is particularly true of the electronics industry which continues to grow in 
importance, with electronic components built into nearly every weapons system and piece of 
equipment. Given the “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA) it seems certain that this 
growth will continue, impacting on both product and process. The result, however, may not 
be the contestable open market many expect (and hope for) as Network Enabled Warfare may 
result in new entrants, such as IT specialist and increased competition.  Alternatively the 
nature of the market may continue to benefit the incumbents. This paper presents an analysis 
of the changes taking place in the industry using firm-level, primary, survey-based, qualitative 
data on corporate conduct. The results suggest that in practice the incumbents do seem to be 
in a strong position. The new demands of the customer require much more than mere 
technical capability. Specialists who do not have established industry relationships, who do 
not understand industry “protocols” and who cannot communicate effectively with the 
customer are unlikely to survive. This suggests that rather than new entrants, there may in fact 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Within the defence sector, technological advancements have seen electronic 
components built into nearly every weapons system and piece of equipment. Combined with 
the “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA) and the attendant push towards “Network 
Enabled or Network Centric Warfare” (NEW), it seems certain that defence electronics will 
continue to grow in importance in the future, enabling far-reaching advances in military 
capability and efficiency. Electronics provide capabilities that are critical to defence 
requirements and the effectiveness and lethality of weapons systems are increasingly 
dependent upon the electronics subsystems they employ. In the case of aircraft, for example, 
multifunctional displays, communication control panels, and related electronic systems and 
components have spread throughout the airframe, not only to improve performance and 
mission capabilities, but also to reduce acquisition and operating costs. Solid-state, modular 
electronics, and other innovations such as "fly-by-wire" and "fly-by-light" flight controls, are 
replacing some of the conventional components, thereby eliminating the huge amount of 
wiring, hydraulic hoses and steel cables found on previous generations of aircraft (Leopold, 
2002). 
  With the growth in importance comes growth in complexity: “The global electronics 
industry represents an increasingly complex landscape” wherein one finds an “increasingly 
complex supply chain” (Andrey, 2003). In this context, this paper makes an attempt to 
understand the developments in and changing natures of the industry. It presents the results of 
an analysis of recent firm-level, primary, survey-based, qualitative data on corporate 
conduct
1. The next section considers the definition and nature of the industry, followed, in 
sections 3, 4 and 5, by an analysis of change in the sector at the levels of company, industry 
and supply network respectively. In section 6 these threads are drawn together in a 
consideration of competitiveness in the sector, which leads in turn to an exploration, in 
section 7, of what may be considered the main force driving change, the Revolution in 
Military Affairs (RMA) and Network Centric Warfare. 
 
2. DEFENCE ELECTRONICS 
 The  defence electronics sector of the industry is usually defined to include two main 
areas: military-specific electronic items (such as avionics and precision guidance systems), 
and commercial devices modified to meet military requirements (such as “ruggedized” 
laptops). However, the defence sector also makes extensive use of electronics throughout all 
its activities, from combat to logistics to base operations (NDU, 1996). Two problems arise 
immediately when attempting to define the extent of the defence electronics sector: “First, 
there is no official Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) definition of the UK electronics 
industry; and second, the defence component of the UK electronics industry is not officially 
identified.”
2  
Analysis of the survey data from the defence electronics companies helps cast some 
light on this issue. The first thing to note is the fact that all companies interviewed reveal 
themselves to be part of larger diversified groups; this is clearly potentially significant when 
considering responses to subsequent enquiries regarding business conduct, strategy and 
disposition reported below. When attempting to define activity areas, a “product – business” 
split can be identified: in terms of product, this is a disparate sector, however, in terms of the 
companies’ view of their core business it is uniform: When questioned about the company’s 
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1 The data comes from a study commissioned by the industry trade association (Intellect) and the UK 
Department of Trade and Industry. See Dowdall, Braddon and Hartley (2003) 
2 To compound the problem, the authors point out how the definition of the national defence industry is 
changing, wherein “national” is currently viewed by UK Government as being where “where the 
technology is created, where the skills and the intellectual property reside, where jobs are created and 
sustained, and where the investment is made’ (MoD, 2002). Such a definition includes foreign-owned 
companies with research and manufacturing facilities located in the UK” (Dowdall, Braddon and 
Hartley (2004).  
main products, there was a variety of responses, but when questioned about the company’s 
main business there was consensus: “solutions providers”, “needs satisfiers”, “systems 
integrators”. Repeatedly interviewers were told how a company no longer viewed itself as a 
supplier of a discrete product or service but as a top-level provider of solutions. This is similar 
to the Ministry of Defence, Defence Procurement Agency response “…we previously bought 
products; now we seek to procure needs satisfaction.” It appears then that some symmetry of 
role has developed between industry and customer. 
 
3. DEFENCE ELECTRONICS COMPANIES AND TECHNOLOGY 
  Companies operating in this “sector” vary widely in terms of the depth of their 
involvement, with respondents reporting defence as 24% to 100% of their total business. In 
fact half of them reported 100%, reflecting the fact that they were part of larger groups, within 
which their functional role and remit is defence electronics. This meant diversification at 
operating company level was not an option. All respondents stated having no intention of 
leaving this business – although approximately half expressed a desire to reduce 
“dependency”.  
Those organisations that were exploring opportunities for diversifying their portfolios 
were largely doing so at the periphery of existing markets, where it required little or no 
further investment in research.  Application areas include: police, ambulance, “detection” 
(chemical, biological), anti-terrorism, ports, liners, air traffic control, para-military, security, 
commercial transport, telecommunications, energy, media and finance. This pattern was 
observed over a decade ago by the UK Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology 
(POST, 1991).  Some organisations approached it somewhat unenthusiastically whereas 
others had made a firm commitment at group level to the exploitation of such technologies
3.  
The motivation for such activity was simple business pragmatism, the pursuit of 
profit and survival. Movement was demand driven and opportunities were explored where 
growth markets had been identified. There was no set pattern of diversification strategy– both 
organic (internal) and merger/acquisition (external) methods were reported. But one point was 
frequently repeated: it was the application of existing products etc to new markets, where no 
new R&D investment was required - a cautious, technology lead approach.  
Another important development has been rapid growth in non-military commercial 
technologies, which has made civilian sectors the technology leaders in all but a few niche 
areas (Brzoska, 2001). It was widely predicted in the early 1990s [OTA, 1992; Gansler, 1995] 
that the combination of the concentration of technological advances in civilian sectors and 
globalisation would result in a higher degree of military-civilian integration of technology and 
production, in companies that primarily produce civilian goods and weapons on the side. It 
would thus lead to a ‘civilianisation’ or ‘normalisation’ of arms producing companies” 
(Brzoska, 2001). There is certainly evidence that technology transfer from the civil sector to 
the military is now a major force in weapons system development and will continue to 
transform both the defence industry itself and, more particularly, the defence electronics 
business (Ruecker, 2000). 
The enhanced flow of cost-effective commercial technologies into military 
procurement is, however, not without problems. Many commercial research and development 
programmes tend to focus on ‘near term technology with short-term payoffs’ such as winning 
the next contract, rather than the longer-term technology developments required to ensure that 
defence capabilities remain ‘leading edge’ in nature (ICAF, 2001). Another issue is that of 
parts obsolescence. The extraordinary pace of change in electronics technology now ensures 
that many parts and components become rapidly obsolete, but military equipment 
programmes are expected to have long life-cycles, meaning virtually every piece of military 
equipment will contain obsolete parts.  Yet, under current market conditions, vendors have no 
obligation or incentive to produce or retain stocks of obsolete parts, which can lead to 
problems (ICAF, 2001). In addition, the need to protect ‘defence-critical’ product and process 
                                                 
3 Further examples of commercial application areas cited in interviews included: Rail, smart cards, civil 
aviation, satellite TV, healthcare, gyros, immigration, oil, satellite tracking and safety.  
technologies, has been recognized particularly in the US and this is constraining the drift 
towards Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) supply (National Research Council, 1999).  
The survey results reflected these developments and showed a considerable overlap 
of defence and civil supply networks, especially at commodity level, with divergence only 
appearing “when ‘defcons’ dictate” and “specialist technical capabilities are specified”; the 
drive towards COTS being offered as one reason for commonality. Even with the low levels 
of involvement in non-military activities, noted earlier, the majority of survey participants 
reported a spin-in of technology from the civil sector. It was suggested that at component 
level, technology development is not defence-specific. When contractors were pressed about 
the exact point at which the technology development became specific to the end (defence) 
market, an equal number of respondents said very late and very early in the process. Those 
reporting very late stage talked of the need to make the end product “rugged” “deployable” 
and “secure”
4, while those early stage were very clear that they considered the defence 
requirements from inception. When asked about future trends in technology transfer between 
defence and civil application areas, as many respondents thought the level of defence to civil 
spin-off would increase as thought the level of civil to defence spin-in would increase. This 
spread might be expected given the range of products and services captured in the sector.  
 
4. DEFENCE ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY  
The restructuring of the defence industry represents one of the most dramatic 
industrial transformations in modern times (Wulf, 2001). Defence equipment development 
and production has become much more transnational in character with teaming and 
programme-specific joint ventures bringing together companies from a number of countries to 
meet procurement requirements (PREST, 2002). The defence companies themselves are also 
experiencing structural reorganisation and are becoming more transnational in both activity 
and ownership, through “… the growth of cross-border mergers, joint ventures and minority 
equity stakeholdings” (James, 2002).  
In the defence electronics industry, the rationalisation and consolidation process has 
been most notable in the Unites States (SIPRI, 2003). Analysts suggest that the single greatest 
percentage of market share – almost one-half of the market - will go to groups of companies 
working together in project-specific partnerships or as "multi-contractors". The UK has also 
seen consolidation with many familiar names now lost inside larger groups.  All, or part of the 
following have changed hands:  
 
Racal TI  STC 
Plessey Ferranti Link  Miles 
Redifusion Simulation  Science Systems  Thorn EMI 
Graseby Dynamics  Redifon  Alenia 
GEC Marconi  Invensys  MEL 
Smiths Industry  Nortel  Thompson-CSF 
TRW  British Aerospace   Computing Devices  
and “new” entities have emerged:  
BAE SYSTEMS  Thales  Smiths Aerospace 
Alenia Marconi Systems   General Dynamics  EADS 
Qinetiq Cogent  Defence  Systems   
 
Reflecting this, most respondents reported having been involved in 
merger/acquisition activity and many also reported concurrent involvement in divestment and 
rationalisation. Interestingly, there was general consensus amongst participants in this survey 
that there are few new competitors in this industry, just “re-packaged” groups; consolidation 
is producing larger competitors (there was some acknowledgment that there are new “niche 
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mentioned  
players”). Similarly, it was felt there were no true exits from the industry only loss of 
identities through horizontal and vertical merger, acquisition and integration
5.  
 
  Incumbents consider themselves to be insulated from new competition due to the 
existence of certain “barriers to entry”.  
Finance – this is an expensive sector in which to compete, involving large scale 
investment in “highly evolved technology”. At the same time, profit rates are 
controlled within MOD contracts. 
Timescale – prospective competitors have to be sure they have sufficient funds and 
robust financial systems to accommodate the extremely drawn out development and 
production timeframes and gaps between initial investment and returns. 
Knowledge, Reputation and Relationships – by far, the most frequently cited 
factors. Dealing successfully with government defence departments was considered to 
require “domain specific knowledge” and this knowledge of differing requirements, 
systems, procedures and protocols came only from experience. Of equal importance 
was knowledge and experience of other parts of the supply system: prime contractors 
and other systems (or sub-systems) integrators needed to have, readily available, 
detailed information on capabilities and resources scattered throughout the supply 
system that could be combined, often on a project-specific basis, in the face of 
vigorous competition. Minimising such search or transactions costs was seen as 
conferring significant competitive advantage and constituting a significant entry 
barrier. A similar situation exists for competitors further away from the end customer, 
where there is a need to be known by the systems integrators and have a good 
reputation. Such formal and informal inter-firm relationships make it extremely 
difficult for new entrants to develop the necessary linkages. This situation is likely to 
be intensified with the current UK MOD policy of reducing the number of direct 
suppliers and making increasing use of Industrial Prime Vendors (IPVs). Sub-
contractors and suppliers will “need to establish new relationships with the IPVs 
rather than with the MoD directly” (MOD, 2004). 
 
Such barriers suggest that contestability is low, meaning existing players believe they 
can act without fear of new competition from market entrants. There were, however, concerns 
among respondents that this comfortable environment was unlikely, as the move towards 
“Network Enabled Warfare” would herald the entry of a new type of competitor – “non-
defence systems specialists” such as IBM, Logica, EDS, Serco. QinetiQ, previously the 
greater part of UK government Defence Evaluation and Research Agency, was also referred 
to as a new, powerful organisation that has the capability to compete in all parts of this 
sector
6. Israel and Eastern Europe were also mentioned as potential sources of new 
competition. 
  Overall, the future looks decidedly uncertain when viewed from the perspective of the 
existing defence electronics contractor – on the one hand there is evidence of a feeling of 
insulation and protection but this is coupled with a growing unease about crumbling barriers 
and new competition. 
 
5. DEFENCE ELECTRONICS SUPPLY NETWORK 
One of the most striking features of the defence electronics supply network in the UK 
is its complexity. Survey participants declared how “… suppliers/customers/ partners are 
                                                 
5 Interestingly, Marconi was frequently cited here – the industry clearly views this case as an exit 
6 BAESYSTEMS announced on 30 March 05 “… an alliance with QinetiQ to identify wider 
commercial applications and business opportunities for its defence and aerospace technologies.” The 
agreement, which may be seen as an attempt to effectively reduce competition, “… initially lasts for six 
months and operates on a shared risk and rewards basis (and) requires QinetiQ to identify, validate and 
develop 'go to market' plans ... It also opens the door to a longer-term relationship between the two 
companies.” (QinetiQ, 2005)  
always changing positions – it depends on the specific venture.” Detailed information about 
suppliers was rarely provided but it is interesting to note that when it was, the names were 
very familiar as, often, they had already been offered earlier in the interview process in 
response to questions on customers and/or competitors: eg BAESYSTEMS, Thales, EDS, 
Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, EADS.  
  Whoever these suppliers were and whatever there inter-firm configuration, what was 
abundantly clear was that supplier lists were being cut dramatically (although the lengths of 
such lists vary widely from 30-40 to 3-4000). The drive towards shorter supplier lists was 
regularly described as a deliberate policy “of consolidation” and an attempt to improve 
quality. Additionally, there was evidence that the increasing pattern of sub-contracting at a 
higher level of sub-assembly was having the effect of reducing supplier lists.  
  Within these supplier lists are a much smaller number of “preferred” suppliers” who 
appear in various guises. On occasions respondents talked of formal preferred suppliers, 
whilst others referred to “de facto” preference and “cultural relationships”. Certain 
organisations had “long term supply agreements,” others had centrally negotiated 
arrangements negotiated at “group” level where certain “synergies” and “critical mass” could 
be achieved. 
  There was no consensus regarding geographic spread – an equal number of responses 
declared spread increasing as declared no change. Those who did say they were looking 
further afield said they did so in pursuit of quality, performance or lower prices. Much talk is 
of China as an emerging source of supply: a 2004 report by Decision Etudes Conseil, refers to 
“A new geographical pattern” suggesting that “by 2007 China will become a major player, 
with production at the same level as Europe and North America. China and the rest of the 
world will account for 40% of world production, and Europe, North America and Japan only 
60%” (Decision Etudes Conseil, 2004).    
 
6. COMPETITIVENESS 
Costs: Technology transfer, the emergence of new technologies and products, and the 
‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ all appear to offer significant potential cost savings to a 
defence sector facing tight budget constraints. It is here that the defence electronics industry 
makes a significant contribution. New avionics/electronics technologies such as flat, 
multifunction panel displays are more efficient and more easily replaced than previous 
equipment. Estimates suggest that the share of avionics and related electronics as a proportion 
of the total value of a military aircraft will increase dramatically over the next ten years from 
around 39 percent of the aircraft purchase price to more than 45 percent.  For the new F-22 
advanced fighter, for example, the value of the electronics is predicted to exceed 50 percent of 
the aircraft's purchase price. To reduce costs, existing military aircraft and missiles, for 
example, will be upgraded with new modular electronic systems, converting them into 
smarter weapons, surveillance and communications platforms, while also cutting acquisition 
costs by extending their life expectancies. Further cost savings will be achieved by the wider 
use of unmanned aerial vehicles that incorporate advanced electronic surveillance and 
communication systems.  
As noted earlier, additional cost reduction and technology acquisition can also be 
pursued in the defence electronics industry through collaboration in the form of strategic 
alliances, partnerships or through offset arrangements. Actually achieving these potential cost 
savings and technology enhancements may, however, prove more difficult than imagined 
(McGuire, 1998). 
 
Scale economies: When respondents were asked about economies of scale, they 
tended to respond that   “our level of production is too small ... but, there again, yes, 
hypothetically … YES! Very important!”. Production runs were considered extremely low: 
“one-offs”, 12, 15 to 20, meaning potential economies of scale were never truly exploited but 
they did exist. As the scale was so small, unit costs were said to fall dramatically as output 
increased and those who provided estimates suggested a doubling of output from current low 
levels would result in average costs falling by 15%, 20% and even 66-75%. It is reasonably  
clear that what is being described here is not “economies of scale” - it is the simple spreading 
of large fixed costs over a small level of output, that is, a short-run production function and 
not the long-run function more commonly associated with scale economies
7.  
 
Learning or knowledge: Beyond the scale of output, it is held that the cumulative 
knowledge gained from the experience of repeating an exercise can result in lower average 
costs, even with small runs. Such reductions were said to be found in particular on the labour 
side and typically “kicked in” at the end of the first batch. While respondents attempted to 
retain this individual knowledge and turn it into organisational knowledge through good 
documentation, they also felt that “knowledge was dissipated and unlearned because of MOD 
batch ordering rather than continuous production.” Contractors also highlighted the potential 
cost savings that can result from cumulative knowledge of the industry, the market and the 
supply network.  It is likely, that as outsourcing increases that experience based knowledge of 
the supply network is likely to be the source of competitive advantage both domestically and 
internationally. That is, a firm may be able to realise significant cost savings through reduced 
“search costs”. 
  
International competition:   When asked to reflect upon their average costs and 
those of their rivals, respondents generally felt that competitors in the UK had no significant 
cost advantages or disadvantages over each other and a few claimed cost advantages over 
their European rivals. They were, however, unanimous in feeling that UK contractors are at a 
significant cost disadvantage to their US rivals, simply because the volume of US production 
allows US contractors to reap the rewards of economies of scale. Respondents suggested that 
they competed on other aspects, their “responsiveness through lean manufacturing”, their 
ability to “customise.”, and their “ability to do the job.” 
 
Development time: Respondents were asked to compare their development time 
relative to their main rivals. First, it was clear that there is no typical development timeframe 
in this sector, but that modularity is driving down times. No significant differences were 
reported between UK and rest of Europe.  US competitors were quicker for standardised 
products, but when new, innovative, customised or bespoke products were required UK 
contractors’ flexibility gives them a potential competitive edge. There is evidence of 
antagonism developing between corporate and government strategy here. If it is true that UK 
defence electronics contractors are gaining certain competitive advantages from customisation 
and problem solving, then it is quite possible that this advantage may be seriously eroded by 
the MOD or prime contractor drive towards lowest price, COTS based, modularity and the 
associated standardisation.  
 
7. FORCES DRIVING CHANGE - RMA 
The economic and military significance of the so-called Revolution in Military 
Affairs is now being widely discussed in the literature (Matthews and Treddenick, 2001; 
Ignatieff, 2001; Hayward, 2001). RMA has become possible by technological developments 
in sensors, IT, communication infrastructures, satellite navigation and reconnaissance; all of 
which incorporate significant inputs from the defence electronics sector. A report from the 
National Defense University, Washington (NDU, 1996), suggests that modern warfare's 
command and control, intelligence, communications, logistics, and weapons systems will rely 
increasingly on electronics to provide the means to gain the necessary information advantage. 
This means there is now an increased emphasis on ‘smart’ electronic systems used in 
intelligence gathering and communications, as well as the more precise delivery of ordnance 
with a minimum of civilian casualties.” (Ruecker, 2000). The ascendancy of terrorism, rogue 
                                                 
7  It should be noted that the defence electronics contractors interviewed as part of this 
research varied dramatically in size. While many companies spoke of production runs below 20, the 
largest bemoaned orders of only 150 and referred to large scale as being 3000 (This, largest contractor 
took as its benchmark the order size enjoyed by US contractors).  
states and organized crime in the post-Cold War, post 9-11, security environment has meant 
that the “quality of surveillance, communication and information management systems are at 
least as important as firepower and other traditional measures of military capability” 
(Kirkpatrick, 2004). A core component of new military doctrine is ‘information dominance’ 
(requiring capabilities included within C4ISR, command, control, communications, computer 
information/surveillance and reconnaissance) (Theile, 2000).  
 
 Respondents in the survey offered an interesting, and somewhat uncertain, view of 
the issue. First the “Revolution in Military Affairs” is actually known by the industry as 
“Network Enabled”, or “Network Centric”, Warfare. The impact of the was considered to be 
highly significant for both product and process innovation
8. It was generally viewed as having 
a positive impact, although the more cautious suggested that whilst the impact would be 
significant they were “…unsure where, when and how.” They felt that it would necessitate 
contractors developing “…a greater understanding of MOD needs … and should also mean 
MOD learns more about industry capabilities.” Another expressed the opinion that it “…will 
allow us to show the customer (MOD) the benefits of COTS; trading off milspecs and 
commercial.” A more critical view expressed concern about the MOD being “swept up in it” 
and “a system of systems is beyond capability.” 
 
Some respondents also suggested possible new competition coming from IT 
specialists such as IBM and Logica, but there was a greater belief that it may in fact have the 
opposite effect. It was contended that in practice the new demands of the customer in this 
environment will require much more than mere technical capability. Specialists who do not 
have established industry relationships, who do not understand industry “protocols” and who 
cannot communicate effectively with the customer will not survive. If the defence sector 
mirror those in consumer electronics, then consolidation is very likely.  Kellender (2005) 
suggests that “many of the networked products now being developed will be replaced by a 
single box or hub” with a shift in demand towards the latter and a consequent industry shake 
out. This combination an  increasing importance of the sector and the increasing concentration 
of suppliers is provoking concern about market failure: “In some areas where the private 
sector proves unwilling or unable to provide the goods and services which MoD requires, 
HMG may have no alternative to the creation of a public facility, similar to the Defence 
Microelectronics Activity (DMEA) in Sacramento which the US government has established 
to provide US forces with electronic components and subsystems which are no longer 
available from the private sector” (Kirkpatrick, 2004).  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has reviewed the restructuring of the defence electronics industry in the 
UK, using information from a survey of respondents. It has revealed considerable change and 
challenges for a strategically important industry and much uncertainty regarding future 
competitive conditions. A number of structural and behavioural patterns can be identified: 
The UK defence electronics firm is not easily classified – it is a disparate sector 
encompassing a large product range, with incumbents being the defence electronics division 
of large, diversified groups. As such, diversification at operating company level is often not a 
strategic option, other than at the periphery of existing markets. There is much merger, 
acquisition and concurrent divestment activity but few new entrants, merely new names as 
groups reconfigure and “re-package”. Existing competitors consider themselves to be 
insulated from new competition due to the existence of certain barriers to entry, seeing 
                                                 
8 Comments included: 
 “…it will affect everything!”; “It will impact on the business mix, capabilities, recruitment, growth...”;  
“The core market will drift … with a possible change in business process towards those found in the 
commercial sector.”; “Everyone in the company in talking about it – it is our business … It will affect 
products, processes, R&D.”; “…a revolution in information sharing.” 
  
experience and knowledge of the industry as an increasingly significant barrier to would-be 
entrants. In the face of Network Enabled Warfare and the Revolution in Military Affairs, it 
was held that the importance of “domain-specific” knowledge will increase and cost related 
competitive advantage will come from efficiencies in external search rather than internal 
production. Organisations who do not have established industry relationships, who do not 
understand industry “protocols” and who cannot communicate effectively with the customer 
will not survive. Not only may there not be new entrants, there may in fact be exits from the 
industry and further consolidation. 
 
Whilst at this point it is not fully clear how these forces and developments will 
ultimately impact upon the sector, what this paper has shown is that the changes that are 
taking place represent important challenges to both the industry and to UK Government. In 
light of such developments it is suggested that a pure market-based solution is unlikely to 
produce satisfactory outcomes and consequently, the crucial issue remains whether the UK 
Government can formulate coherent research, acquisition and industrial policies, and whether 
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